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Jane Thomson*

Disinheritance, Discrimination, and the Case
for Including Adult Independent Children in
Dependants’ Relief Schemes: Lawen Estate v
Nova Scotia

In 2019 a Superior Court in Nova Scotia excluded adult independent
children as “Dependants” under Nova Scotia’s Testator’s Family
Maintenance Act. The decision was based on a finding that testamentary
autonomy is a constitutional right protected by s. 7 of Canada’s Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. This article explains why the constitutional decision
in Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia was incorrect. It also demonstrates why
the inclusion of adult independent children in dependants’ relief schemes
is not only benign in most instances, but may play a role in preventing the
perpetuation of discrimination in the private law. This article also contains
a brief post-script that discusses the appeal of the Lawen decision that
was released in 2021 and a reference to a subsequent case commentary
on that decision.

En 2019, une Cour supérieure de la Nouvelle-Écosse a exclu les enfants
adultes indépendants en tant que « personnes à charge » en vertu de
la Testator’s Family Maintenance Act de la Nouvelle-Écosse. La décision
était fondée sur une conclusion selon laquelle l’autonomie testamentaire
est un droit constitutionnel protégé par l’article 7 de la Charte canadienne
des droits et libertés. Dans cet article, nous expliquons pourquoi la
décision constitutionnelle dans l’affaire Lawen Estate c Nova-Scotia était
incorrecte. Nous démontrons également pourquoi l’inclusion des enfants
adultes autonomes dans les régimes d’aide aux personnes à charge est
non seulement bénigne dans la plupart des cas, mais peut jouer un rôle
dans la prévention de la perpétuation de la discrimination en droit privé.
Cet article contient également un bref post-scriptum qui traite de l’appel
de la décision Lawen qui a été publié en 2021 et une référence à un
commentaire portant sur une affaire postérieure à cette décision.

*
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like to acknowledge and thank UNB law students Rebecca Buxton and Tyler White for their research
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Introduction
No shortage of news stories, reports, opinion pieces, and studies address
whether adult independent children should have the right to challenge a
deceased parent’s will. The idea is controversial, and many harbor at least a
vague unease at the idea of a financially independent adult having the right
to contest the carefully considered testamentary wishes of their parent.
The most recent and significant manifestation of this unease was the 2019
decision of Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (Attorney General),1 where the
Nova Scotia Supreme Court excluded adult independent children from
making claims under Nova Scotia’s Testators’ Family Maintenance Act,2
because their inclusion violated the constitutional rights of testators.
1.
2.

2019 NSSC 162 [Lawen].
RSNS 1989, c 465 [TFMA].
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In Lawen, Justice Bodurtha of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held
that the provisions of the TFMA naming “adult non-disabled children” as
dependants contravened section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms3 pursuant to his finding that testamentary autonomy was a liberty
right. He concluded that the deprivation of liberty caused by including
adult independent children in the TFMA could not be saved under section
1 of the Charter. The provision’s objective, he held, was “purely moral”
in nature and therefore not pressing or substantial. He accordingly read the
Act down to exclude adult non-disabled children.
The appeal of Lawen will likely be heard in early 2021.4 This article
argues that it should be granted for the following reasons:
First, the decision is constitutionally unsound. To achieve his end
result, Justice Bodurtha’s reasons mis-categorize testamentary autonomy
as a liberty interest rather than a property one. His judgement also skips
over essential steps of a section 7 analysis, and in his section 1 analysis, the
legislative purpose for including one category of claimant is wrongfully
distinguished from the others.
Second, the decision is unnecessary. If a court wishes to reflect societal
disproval of adult independent children applying for dependants’ relief,
it may do so in accordance with the highly-discretionary nature of the
legislation itself. Other jurisdictions, where adult children are permitted to
challenge a parent’s will, have adopted and apply restrictive criteria when
hearing such claims. In New Brunswick and Saskatchewan, this practice
has resulted in a virtual bar on such claims made by adult independent
children.
Finally, the decision is harmful. The inclusion of adult children in
statutes like the TFMA provides the sole legal forum for the scrutiny of
a specific type of discrimination within the private law: the use of wills
and the legal system to perpetuate discrimination through so called
disinheritance clauses. By virtue of the TFMA’s discretionary nature and
the requirement for judges to apply discretionary powers in accordance
with Charter values, dependants’ relief claims provide a forum for courts
to scrutinize and sometimes censure such behavior. A handful of cases in
British Columbia are illustrative of this fact.
This article begins with an explanation of the purpose and role of
dependants’ relief legislation in Canada. Part II reviews and critiques
3.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
[Charter].
4.
The Appeal in Lawen was heard in February of 2021. A post-script to this article addresses the
decision.
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the Lawen decision with respect to the application judge’s constitutional
analysis. Part III explains why the decision was unnecessary and what the
Court could have done if presented with the TFMA claims of Jack Lawen’s
daughters. It also discusses why the inclusion of adult independent
children in dependants’ relief legislation is necessary: to guard against the
perpetuation of degrading and cruel discrimination by way of estate law.
I.

Dependants’ relief legislation

1. The Nature and history of dependants’ relief claims
The first dependants’ relief statutes were adopted in Canada at the
beginning of the 20th century.5 They allowed for the widows, children
(and eventually widowers)6 of a testator to sue an estate for financial
relief if the testator’s will failed to provide for the adequate maintenance
of his surviving family.7 These statutes rebuffed the notion of absolute
testamentary autonomy.8
Prior to dependants’ relief legislation, testators could and often did
leave the bulk of their estate to their eldest son and provide no financial
independence to their widows or remaining children.9 As noted by Justice
McLachlin (as she then was) in Tataryn v Tataryn Estate,10 the original
wills variation legislation of British Columbia owed its enactment to
those women’s groups at the turn of the 20th century who lobbied their
provincial government for its adoption.11 Indeed, dependants’ relief is
one of the earliest examples of a legislated redistribution of property and
5.
These included the Alberta’s Married Women’s Relief Act, SA 1910, c 18 (2nd Sess);
Saskatchewan’s An Act to Amend The Devolution of Estates Act, SS 1910-11, c 13; British Columbia’s
Testator’s Family Maintenance Act, SBC 1920, c 94; Ontario’s Dependants’ Relief Act, SO 1929, c
47; Manitoba’s The Testator’s Family Maintenance Act, SM 1946, c 64; New Brunswick’s Testator’s
Family Maintenance Act, SNB 1959, c 14; Nova Scotia’s Testator’s Family Maintenance Act, SNS
1956, c 8 [TFMA 1956]; Prince Edward Island’s Testator’s Dependants Relief Act, SPEI 1974, c 47;
Newfoundland and Labrador’s Family Relief Act, SN 1962, c 56; Northwest Territories’ Dependants
Relief Act, ONWT 1971 (2nd Sess), c 5; Yukon’s Dependants’ Relief Ordinance 1929, OYT 1962 (1st
Sess), c 9.
6.
Both Alberta and Saskatchewan initially restricted access to their statutes to widows. See
Cameron Harvey & Linda Vincent, The Law of Dependant’s Relief in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto:
Thomson Carswell, 2006) at 2.
7.
Albert H Oosterhoff et al, Oosterhoff on Wills, 8th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016) at 852853.
8.
As Justice of Appeal Ford of the Alberta Supreme Court explained in 1939, “At common law
the duty of a husband arising out of the marriage to maintain the wife disappears when the marriage is
dissolved either by divorce or death. Before the passing of The Widows Relief Act under the title of The
Married Women’s Relief Act in December, 1910, SA, 1910, 2nd sess, ch 18, there was no limitation
on the testamentary power of a husband over his property” Re Rist Estate, [1939] 1 WWR 518, 1939
CarswellAlta 12 (SC (AD)) at paras 35-36.
9.
Ibid.
10. (1994), 116 DLR (4th) 193, 1994 CarswellBC 1243 (SCC) [Tataryn].
11. Ibid at para 10.
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wealth, regardless of ownership or title, following family breakdown.12
According to former Chief Justice McLachlin, the purpose of the Act and
those like it was to keep dependants “from becoming a charge on the state,”
but they also represented a “foreshadowing [of] more modern concepts
of equality.”13 Family law legislation, informed by this same concept of
financial equality between husbands and wives, would be enacted only
decades later.14
Today every province and territory in Canada has its own form of
dependants’ relief legislation. Although these acts vary with respect to who
may apply for relief and under what circumstances, only Manitoba requires
that a claimant be in “financial need” in order to be eligible for relief under
its statute.15 The majority of these acts contain an operating clause that
allows for claims where a testator has not “made adequate provision” for
his or her dependants.16 What “adequate provision” means is left up to the
broad discretionary authority of the courts with some legislative guidance,
such as the factors a court must consider listed in section 5 of the TFMA.17
The provincial or territorial legislature determines who qualifies as a
“dependant.”
Dependants’ relief legislation is the sole source of financial support
available to the surviving family of the testator or intestate who find
themselves inadequately provided for by that person’s estate.18 With the

12. For a detailed account of what rights married women in Canada had in relation to property at this
time and immediately before it, see Constance Backhouse, “Married Women’s Property Law in 19th
Century Canada” (1988) 6:2 L & Hist Rev 211.
13. Tataryn, supra note 10 at para 16.
14. Mary Jane Mossman, ed, Property Law Cases and Commentary, 4th ed (Toronto: Emond, 2019)
at 590-596, 606-616.
15. The Dependants Relief Act, SM 1989–1990, c 42, s 2(1).
16. Alberta: Wills and Succession Act, SA 2010, c W-12.2, s 88(1); British Columbia: Wills, Estates
and Succession Act, SBC 2009, c 13, s 60; Manitoba: The Dependant’s Relief Act, supra note 14, s
2(1); New Brunswick: Provision for Dependants Act, RSNB 2012, c 111, s 2(1); Newfoundland and
Labrador: Family Relief Act, RSN 1990, c F-3, s 3(1); Northwest Territories: Dependants Relief Act,
RSNWT 1988, c D-4, s 2(1); Nova Scotia: TFMA 1989, supra note 2, s 3(1); Nunavut: Dependants
Relief Act, RSNWT 1988, c D-4, s 2(1); Ontario: Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S.26, s
58(1); Prince Edward Island: Dependants of a Deceased Person Relief Act, RSPEI 1988, c D-7, s 2;
Saskatchewan: The Dependant’s Relief Act, 1996, SS 1996, c D-25.01, s 3; Yukon: Dependants Relief
Act, RSY 2002, c 56, s 2; Quebec: Quebec Code Civil, Chapter V Arts 684-695. Quebec’s scheme is
a continuation of family law support obligations owed during the testator’s lifetime rather than a true
dependants’ relief scheme.
17. These factors are discussed below, infra note 61. For other examples see s 62(1) of Ontario’s
Succession Law Reform Act, ibid.
18. One limited exception to this is the law of Dower where still applicable in Canada’s western
provinces. See Bruce Ziff, “Whatever Happened to the Law of Dower? It’s Alive and Unwell and
Living on the Prairies A Case Comment on Schwormstede v. Green Drop Ltd. (40 RPR (2d) 1) and
Bank of Montreal v Pawluk (40 RPR (2d) 18)” (1994) 40 RPR (2d) 44.
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exception of Quebec,19 no jurisdiction in Canada permits a person to sue
an estate for spousal or child support.20 While many jurisdictions permit
an application for the division or equalization of property by surviving
(and usually married) spouses, the jurisdictions of Prince Edward Island,
British Columbia and the Yukon allow for no such applications.21
2. Nova Scotia’s Testators’ Family Maintenance Act
The dependants’ relief act at issue in Lawen was Nova Scotia’s Testators’
Family Maintenance Act. Its operating clause reads as follows:
3 (1) Where a testator dies without having made adequate provision
in his will for the proper maintenance and support of a dependant, a
judge, on application by or on behalf of the dependant, has power, in his
discretion and taking into consideration all relevant circumstances of the
case, to order that whatever provision the judge deems adequate be made
out of the estate of the testator for the proper maintenance and support
of the dependant.22

In 1976, the TFMA 1956’s purpose was reviewed by the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal in Garrett v Zwicker:
The Act…is designed to enforce the moral obligation of a testator to use
his testamentary powers for the purpose of making proper and adequate
provision after his death for the support of his wife and children, having
regard to his means, to the means and deserts of the several claimants,
and to the relative urgency of the various moral claims upon his bounty.23

19. See Article 684 Quebec Civil Code that provides “Every creditor of support may within six
months after the death claim a financial contribution from the succession as support. The right exists
even where the creditor is an heir or a legatee by particular title or where the right to support was not
exercised before the date of the death, but does not exist in favour of a person unworthy of inheriting
from the deceased.” [Emphasis added] Art 684 CCQ.
20. While many provisions allow an estate to be bound by a support order, it is not possible to
commence a de novo application for support after a person has died. British Columbia’s Family Law
Act, SBC 2011, c 25, ss 170(g)–171; Alberta’s Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 80; Saskatchewan’s
The Family Maintenance Act, 1997, SS 1997, c F-6.2, ss 3–8; Manitoba’s The Family Maintenance
Act, RSM 1987, c F-20, ss 10(1)(h), 37(5); Ontario’s Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F3, s 34(4);
New Brunswick’s Family Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2, s This was repealed.(6); Nova Scotia’s
Parenting and Support Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, ss 5, 8; Prince Edward Island’s Family Law Act, SPEI
1995, c 12, s 34(3); Newfoundland and Labrador’s Family Law Act, RSN 1990, c F-2, s 57.
21. See table Appendix A.
22. TFMA, supra note 2.
23. The court continued: “The provision which the court may properly make in default of testamentary
provision is that which a just and wise father would have thought it his moral duty to make in the
interests of his widow and children had he been fully aware of all the relevant circumstances.” Garrett
v Zwicker, 1976 CarswellNS 9, [1976] NSJ No 20 (NS CA) at para 19 [Zwicker] citing Re Allen; Allen
v Manchester, [1922] NZLR 218 at 220.
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Since its enactment in 1956, only three minor revisions have been
made to the Act.24 Indeed, the modern TFMA, represents one of the most
traditional models of dependants’ relief legislation in Canada. This is
because it allows only for the widow or widower of the testator or the
testator’s biological or legally adopted children to make relief claims
against the estate. Further, the Act applies only to the variation of wills and
is not available in the event of an intestacy. With respect to the children
of testators, the TFMA makes no distinction between the claims of minor
children and those of adult, independent children:
In this Act,
(a) “child” includes a child
(i) lawfully adopted by the testator,
(ii) of the testator not born at the date of the death of the testator,
(iii) of which the testator is the natural parent;25

In contrast to Nova Scotia, the majority of dependants’ relief acts in Canada
now allow for claims made by the common-law spouses of testators, and
many provide for claims made by non-biological children, not legally
adopted by the testator.26 Furthermore, almost all dependants’ relief
legislation allows for claims made in the event of an intestacy, providing a
financial lifeline to common law spouses and step-children who are usually
excluded from intestacy provisions as they are in Nova Scotia.27 Notably,
until the Lawen decision, a more popular characteristic the TFMA shared
with other legislation was its inclusion of adult independent children as
dependants.28

24. These include: 1) adding children in-utero at the time of the testator’s death as dependants (TFMA,
supra note 2, s 2(a)(ii)); 2) removing a provision that prohibited orders made for a widow “living apart
from [the testator] at the time of his death under circumstances which would disentitle her to alimony”
(TFMA 1956, supra note 4, ss 18, 17); and 3) adding registered domestic partners as dependants
“[u]pon registration of a domestic-partner declaration, domestic partners, as between themselves and
with respect to any person, have as of the date of the registration the same rights and obligations as…a
widow or widower under the Testators’ Family Maintenance Act” (Law Reform (2000) Act, SNS 2000,
c 29, s 54(2)(l)). Domestic partnerships in Nova Scotia are voluntary agreements persons in common
law relationships may enter into in order to avail themselves of those rights and benefits reserved for
married persons. These arrangements are reserved for those couples who actively choose to register
and are not imposed as a default scheme as they are in other provinces. See Vital Statistics Act, RSNS
1989, c 494, ss 52–59.
25. TFMA, supra note 2 at s 2.
26. For a comprehensive review of Canada’s laws on dependants’ relief, see Harvey & Vincent,
supra note 6.
27. Intestate Succession Act, RSNS 1989, c 236; Young v Jackson Estate, 2021 NSCA 74.
28. The other statutes that provide for such relief are: New Brunswick’s Provision for Dependants
Act, supra note 16, s 1; Newfoundland and Labrador’s Family Relief Act, supra note 16, s 2;
British Columbia’s Wills, Estates and Succession Act, supra note 16, s 60; and Saskatchewan’s The
Dependant’s Relief Act, supra note 16, s 2.
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II. Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (Attorney General)
Jack Lawen executed his will on May 27, 2009. In it, he gifted $50,000 to
two of his daughters, Catherine Tawil and Samia Khoury,29 and directed
the residue of his estate to go to his son, Michael.30 The value of the
estate was estimated to be $130,000; however, prior to his father’s death,
Michael Lawen had conveyed himself over 2 million dollars’ worth of real
estate owned by his father through a power of attorney that the daughters
alleged was no longer valid at the time their brother invoked it.31 The
daughters challenged the validity of those conveyances and made claims
for relief under the TFMA against their father’s estate.32 Their brother
moved for summary judgment on his sisters’ application, arguing they
lacked standing to challenge the validity of the conveyances as only the
executors, their uncles, had standing to do so.33 The Court found that the
sisters had standing, based primarily on their right to make a TFMA claim
against the estate.34
In response, Michael Lawen and one of his uncles who was an
executor of the estate commenced their own legal action by way of a
Charter challenge, seeking the exclusion of adult independent children as
dependants under the Act. Specifically, they argued sections 2(b) and 3(1)
of the TFMA,35 which enumerate adult children as dependants, violated
section 2(a) or section 7 of the Charter.
The applicants requested that these provisions:
be read down to “refer only to children to whom a testator owes a
legal obligation and not children to whom a testator owes a ‘moral
obligation.’” In other words, the TFMA should not “permit adult nondisabled children to advance applications pursuant to the TFMA.36

29. The testator’s third daughter Mary was disabled and under government care. It is not clear from
the facts of Tawil v Lawen, 2016 NSSC 323 at para 3 [Tawil] whether she was gifted anything under
the will at all.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid at para 12.
34. Ibid at paras 22, 25.
35. TFMA, supra note 2; these sections read as follows:
2 In this Act, …
(b) “dependant” means the widow or widower or the child of a testator;
Order for adequate maintenance and support
3 (1) Where a testator dies without having made adequate provision in his will for the proper
maintenance and support of a dependant, a judge, on application by or on behalf of the dependant,
has power, in his discretion and taking into consideration all relevant circumstances of the case,
to order that whatever provision the judge deems adequate be made out of the estate of the
testator for the proper maintenance and support of the dependant.
36. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 7.
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While Justice Bodurtha rejected the applicants’ freedom of conscience
claim,37 he agreed that the TFMA’s inclusion of adult independent
children as dependants constituted a violation of a testator’s section
7 rights and could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter. Justice
Bodurtha accordingly ordered that the provision be read down to exclude
independent adult children from sections 2(b) and 3(1) of the TFMA as
allowed by section 52 of the Charter.38
The following sections explain the problems with Justice Bodurtha’s
sections 7 and 1 Charter analyses and demonstrate why the inclusion of
adult independent children in dependants’ relief legislation is not capable
of attracting Charter scrutiny, let alone violating any Charter right.
1. The section 7 analysis in Lawen
a. Testamentary autonomy as a liberty right
It is broadly accepted that section 7 of the Charter does not protect
economic interests.39 Protection of property was deliberately excluded
from the Charter’s purview at the insistence of the provinces when it
was drafted.40 This fact has underlined virtually every decision regarding
a government’s right to interfere with or outright take an individual’s
property.41
Justice Bodurtha acknowledged this point,42 but he nevertheless held
that testamentary autonomy could not be reduced to “a purely economic
37. Ibid at para 75; he found that “[a] violation of s. 2(a) cannot simply follow from a finding that a
decision is a fundamental personal choice of the kind discussed in the section 7 caselaw. At the very
least…‘conscience’ must mean something analogous to religious belief.”
38. Ibid at para 121.
39. Peter Hogg, “The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the Charter” (2012) 58:2 SCLR 195 [Hogg,
“Section 7”].
40. Reference re ss 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 SCR 1123, 1990 CarswellMan
206 at para 59 [Prostitution Reference]: “There is also a significant difference in the wording of s. 7
and the Fourteenth Amendment. The American provision specifically protects property interests, while
our framers did not choose to similarly protect property rights.”
41. Alexander Alvaro, “Why Property Right Were Excluded from the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms” (1991) 24:2 Can J Political Science 309; Bruce Ziff, “Taking Liberties: Protections for
Private Property in Canada” in Elizabeth Cooke, ed, Modern Studies in Property Law, vol 3 (Oxford:
Hart, 2005) at 347. Notably, when the applicants in Lawen first sought declarations of invalidity,
Nova Scotia’s Attorney General moved for summary judgement against them, claiming, in part, that
the applicants’ claims were unlikely to succeed and the sections of the Charter relied upon by the
applicants did not “extend to encompass testamentary dispositions” (Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia
(Attorney General), 2018 NSSC 188 at para 13).
42. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 58; the Attorney General raised the example of expropriation to
demonstrate the absence of Charter protection for property rights. Justice Bodurtha believed this to be
a flawed analogy. In his opinion, expropriation “does not involve a choice or decision by the owner of
the land, but an act of the state in relation to ownership”. This seems an odd way to frame the issue, as
it is easy to see how this analogy very much involves a choice or decision by a land owner. The choice
is the individual’s decision to purchase the home in the first place and to continue to live there. The
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or financial interest.”43 He adopted the arguments of the applicants and
agreed that testamentary freedom could be distinguished from inter
vivos decisions concerning property. He held that testamentary freedom
“involves ‘moral choices which are important to an individual’s sense
of dignity and autonomy’ and is a way to ‘reward or sanction family
members and friends, influence the lives of progeny, and, for some who
are ill or in their latter years, attract the attention, and care, of family and
friends.’”44 Rather than a property interest, Justice Bodurtha characterized
testamentary autonomy as a “social interest” and “a fundamental personal
choice” protected under the liberty branch of section 7.45
In support of this reasoning, Justice Bodurtha cited several Supreme
Court of Canada decisions concerning section 7 liberty interests. These
included the right to safe, medical abortions,46 the right to doctor assisted
death,47 and the right to choose medical treatment for one’s child.48 Justice
Bodurtha found that, like these examples, testamentary autonomy was an
inherently private decision that could “rise to the level of fundamental
personal choice of the kind contemplated in the caselaw under s. 7.”49
An initial problem with this stage of the section 7 analysis in Lawen is
the incongruence between the Supreme Court of Canada precedent cited
and the issue at bar. If anything, by inviting a comparison between the
right to a safe abortion and the right to decide the fate of one’s property
after death, the proprietary nature of testamentary freedom is heightened
rather than diminished.
government’s decision to expropriate is its subsequent interference with any decisions the homeowner
might make with respect to his property. However, if a clearer example of the Canadian Government’s
untrammeled right to interfere with an individual’s decisions related to their property is required,
one need only look to the law of de facto expropriation. Indeed, in the leading case, Mariner Real
Estate Ltd v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 1999 NSCA 98, Justice of Appeal Cromwell (as he then
was) was asked whether landowners should be compensated for regulation of their land that greatly
restricted their ability to build private cottages. Justice Cromwell found that the landowners were
entitled to nothing, noting at para 42, “In this country, extensive and restrictive land use regulation is
the norm.”
43. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 46.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid at paras 46, 60.
46. R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 1988 CarswellOnt 45.
47. Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 cited in Lawen, supra note 1 at para 54.
48. B (R) v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315, 1995 CarswellOnt
105. Justice Bodurtha also referenced other decisions that provided slightly less bodily autonomyfocused examples of section 7 interests such as the education of one’s children in accordance with
one’s beliefs or one’s choice of residence. However, these latter citations were in reference to
dissenting or minority opinions only. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 52 citing dissent in R v Jones, [1986]
2 SCR 284, 1986 CarswellAlta 181 and minority in Godbout c Longueuil (Ville), [1997] 3 SCR 844,
1997 CarswellQue 883.
49. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 61.
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Second and more importantly, Justice Bodurtha’s reasons fail to
sufficiently distinguish the decision-making behind the distribution
of property by way of will from the decision-making involved in inter
vivos conveyances of property. Even if one accepted the argument that
using one’s money to punish, manipulate or ingratiate others to one’s self
or cause goes to the core of a person’s autonomy and dignity and thus
attracts the protection of section 7, this practice is hardly the province of
wills alone. A key example is the use of a conditional, inter vivos trust
that, absent some contravention of public policy or the rule in Saunders
v Vautier,50 can impose conditions upon the beneficiaries through strict
instructions to the trustees.51 Inter vivos property conveyances also play
a significant role in estate planning and intertwine with decisions related
to the drafting of a will and its contents. Colloquially referred to as “will
substitutes,” these conveyances occur during a testator’s lifetime but are
geared towards estate planning and distribution.52 Apart from the reasons
attributed to estate planning by Justice Bodurtha, testators often convey
their property while alive to avoid probate fees, taxes, or, relevant to the
case at bar, challenges to one’s will.53
Indeed, if the right of testamentary autonomy is a right of a living
person as Justice Bodurtha held,54 its distinction from other decisions
taken while one is alive that concern one’s property becomes even more
tenuous. The decision to dispose of property in a will and the decision to
dispose of property through an inter vivos conveyance are both decisions
made by a living person, often with identical goals. Furthermore, if these
goals contravene public policy or some other facet of the common law
that governs property, courts have the jurisdiction to interfere with the

50. [1841] EWHC Ch J82, Cr & Ph 240, 4 Beav 115 8 (HC). This rule allows beneficiaries of a trust
to end it prematurely and received a payout of its capital. This is provided that all of beneficiaries are
of the age of majority, have capacity to make this decision and that the trust contains no gift-over and
has no other conditions except that the beneficiaries attain a certain age over that of majority. For a
recent Supreme Court of Canada decision that involved a consideration of the rule see: Buschau v
Rogers Communications Inc. 2006 SCC 28 at para 21.
51. See e.g. Re Ogilvy, 1966 CarswellOnt 138, 58 DLR (2d) 385.
52. Examples include placing a property in joint tenancy with an adult child, adding a common law
spouse to a bank account or investment, or advancing a child’s inheritance while the testator is still
alive.
53. See Oosterhoff et al, supra note 7 at 185.
54. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 45; in his reasons, Justice Bodurtha concluded that Hislop v Canada
(Attorney General), 2007 SCC 10 [Hislop], wherein the Supreme Court found that an estate does
not have standing to advance a Charter claim, did not apply to the case at bar. This was because “the
court’s concern [in Hislop] was with the claim by the estate, not with the testator’s ability to dispose
of their assets.”
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resulting conveyance, whether the gift is made during the life of a testator
or after it.55
In sum, Justice Bodurtha’s reasons fail to sufficiently distinguish
decisions to dispose of property by way of will from those decisions
executed through inter vivos conveyances. Testamentary autonomy
remains what it has always been: an interest in maintaining control over
one’s private property after one dies. It cannot attract protection from
section 7 of the Charter, as to do so would create, as some have termed
it, a “back door” constitutional right to protection of property from state
interference.56
b. The principles of fundamental justice?
The final problem with the section 7 reasoning in Lawen is that it provides
no analysis on whether testamentary autonomy is inconsistent with the
principles of fundamental justice (PFJ), the crucial second step of a section
7 finding.57 In explanation of this, Justice Bodurtha wrote:
The applicants say the deprivation of the testator’s liberty does not accord
with the principles of fundamental justice. However, the applicants rely
on a section 1 Charter analysis for this aspect of the test. Similarly, the
Attorney General makes no reference to the principles of fundamental
justice. As a result, I infer the Attorney General accepts if a violation
of the liberty interest is found, that violation will not accord with the
principles of fundamental justice.58

Unfortunately, the inference made by Justice Bodurtha is not in accordance
with the basic law concerning section 7 of the Charter. In a section 7
challenge, the onus rests on the applicants to prove, on a balance of
probabilities, both an infringement of a testator’s liberty interest and its
inconsistency with a PFJ.59 It is not open to a court to find a section 7
violation based on a deprivation of liberty without also determining
whether the deprivation is in accordance with the PFJ.60

55. Bruce Ziff, “Welcome the Newest Unworthy Heir” 1 ETR-CAN-ART 76; Jane Thomson,
“Discrimination and the Private Law in Canada: Reflections on Spence v BMO Trust Co” (2019) 36
Windsor YB Access Just 138.
56. Hogg, “Section 7,” supra note 39; Lawen, supra note 1 at para 57 citing Blencoe v British
Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 at para 53.
57. Bedford v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 72 at para 93 [Bedford].
58. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 62.
59.
Prostitution Reference, supra note 41 at para 14.
60. Bedford, supra note 57 at para 93. Apart from procedural fairness, the three major PFJ as
identified by the Supreme Court of Canada are arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross-disproportionality.
Bedford at para 97.
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Given that the purpose attributed by Justice Bodurtha to the impugned
provision61 was to impose “a moral standard on testamentary freedom”62 by
creating obligations owed by testators to their adult independent children,
it is difficult to identify with which PFJ the deprivation of liberty at issue is
in discord. The effect of the provision is directly connected to its purpose.63
Likewise, it is clear that the effect of the provision is neither overbroad nor
grossly disproportionate to its goal. This is due not only to the tailored and
limited connection between the provision’s effect and its goal, but also to
the wide discretion afforded to a court in determining the claims of adult
independent children against an estate. As the Attorney General argued in
Lawen, a court is under no obligation to issue an order under the TFMA
following an application.64 Furthermore, the TFMA includes criteria a
court must consider prior to making these awards that suggest the awards
are tailored to the specific circumstances of each application rather than
any general notion of entitlement.65
Presumably, the Attorney General’s submissions did not include a
reference to the PFJ because the Attorney General believed that no interest
under section 7 was infringed. Regardless, if we apply the purpose of the
impugned provision to a PFJ analysis, it becomes clear that no section 7
violation can be made out.
Unfortunately, the constitutional problems with the Lawen decision
only deepen with its section 1 analysis, which not only fails to fix the
decision’s section 7 problems, but also is itself based on a misunderstanding
of the basic and sole objective of dependants’ relief legislation like the
TFMA.
2. The section 1 analysis in Lawen
The first stage of the section 1 analysis as defined in R v Oakes asks
whether the objective of impugned legislation relates “to concerns which
are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society.”66 However,
the parties’ pleadings on this step are not easily discernable in the Lawen
decision. Justice Bodurtha’s reasons suggest that the Attorney General
offered two different purposes for the TFMA67 whereas the applicants’
61. As later determined by Justice Bodurtha in his section 1 analysis and explained below.
62. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 103.
63. If the purpose of the provision is to fulfill the moral obligations of a testator towards adult
independent children, and its effect is to allow those children to make support claims against a
testator’s estate, then one cannot argue that the deprivation caused by the provision is arbitrary.
64. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 59.
65. Ibid at para 99 citing TFMA, supra note 2.
66. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001 at para 73.
67. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 84; Justice Bodurtha notes that the Attorney General argued the Act
was “intended to enforce testators’ moral obligations to make adequate provision for their dependents,”

654 The Dalhousie Law Journal

framing of the issue is not clear and must be inferred by their other section
1 related arguments. 68
Regardless, as Justice Bodurtha correctly noted, it is not the purpose
of the Act that is relevant to a section 1 analysis, but that of the impugned
provision.69 On this point, Justice Bodurtha did not accept the purpose
identified by the Attorney General to encompass that of the impugned
provision. Furthermore, the applicants’ section 1 arguments appeared based
on what they viewed as the objective of the overall Act. 70 Justice Bodurtha
therefore supplied his own purpose, concluding that the objective of
including adult independent children as dependants under the TFMA was
“purely moral” in nature.71 He held that “imposing a moral standard on
testamentary freedom” was not pressing and substantial in its objective.72
In doing so, Justice Bodurtha noted that while laws based on moral grounds
or “social policy issues” had been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada,
this one was not tenable given that it limited “fundamental rights.”73
The problems with Justice Bodurtha’s section 1 analysis are
threefold. First, as noted above, it fails to establish the principle of
fundamental justice with which the liberty violation failed to accord.
Second, it wrongly attributes a different objective to the inclusion of adult
children as dependents from the objective of the over-all Act. Third, a
review of constitutional challenges to legislation with similar objectives
demonstrates that the purpose of the TFMA relates very much to concerns
that are considered pressing and substantial in our democratic society.
a. The PFJ problem
Recall that in his reasons, Justice Bodurtha declined to identify the PFJ
with which the deprivation of testator’s liberty failed to accord. Instead
but also that the Attorney General identified the pressing and substantial objective of the Act to be
“balancing the legitimate proprietary interests of [a testator’s] heirs in respect of family provision...
This means balancing the importance of a testator’s will with that of ensuring that the financial needs
of spouses and children of testators are adequately met.” Ibid at para 84.
68. No purpose of the Act is expressly attributed to the applicants’ arguments. However, an inference
can be drawn from their arguments concerning the rational connection stage of the Oakes test. These
arguments suggest they believed the TFMA’s purpose to be the provision of financial relief for those
who can establish need or legal dependency during the life of a testator (ibid at para 102). It is not
clear which, if either purpose, Bodurtha J. accepted with respect to the TFMA. Earlier in his reasons,
Justice Bodurtha cited the purpose attributed to the TFMA in Zwicker, supra note 23, (ibid at para 19).
However, his finding that the inclusion of adult independent children as eligible applicants rendered
the Attorney General’s overall objective “incoherent” suggests that he agreed with the applicants.
69. Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 1998 CarswellAlta 210 at para 11; Fraser v Canada
(Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 at para 125; Lawen, supra note 1 at para 96.
70. Lawen, supra note 1 at paras 101-102, 109, 115.
71. Ibid at paras 85-86, 96.
72. Ibid at para 110.
73. Ibid at para 96.
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he accepted the applicants’ arguments that this point could be proven
through a section 1 analysis. However, when turning to the next steps of
the Oakes test, Justice Bodurtha did not accept the applicants’ arguments
that the provision failed to accord with the remaining steps of the Oakes
test.74 Instead, he held that if the objective of imposing a moral standard
on testamentary freedom was pressing and substantial, then the means
chosen to achieve the objective would be rationally connected, minimally
impairing and proportionate in accordance with the Oakes test and section
1 of the Charter.75 This finding is remarkable given the close relationship
between the proportionality step of the Oakes test and the PFJ analysis of
section 7.76 By concluding that the provision was not overbroad, arbitrary
or grossly disproportionate in the section 1 portion of his analysis, Justice
Bodurtha’s reasoning essentially confirms that no violation of section 7
actually took place to necessitate a section 1 analysis in the first place.
b. A single purpose
The second problem with Justice Bodurtha’s section 1 analysis is the
notion that the legislative purpose for including adult independent
children as dependants differs from the purpose for including spouses and
minor children in the TFMA. By stating that the purpose behind including
adult independent children is moral, Justice Bodurtha’s reasoning infers
that the purpose behind including all other dependants is something other
than moral. Justice Bodurtha describes the claims of spouses and minor
or dependent children as being based on “actual dependency or financial
need” or as ones that would attract “a legal obligation of support in the
testator’s lifetime.”77
This purpose-based distinction between dependants is untenable
for two main reasons. First, neither financial need nor inter vivos legal
dependency constitutes a mandatory criterion to be met before a court will
issue an order under the TFMA. Second, this reasoning reflects a common
error of conflating the interpretative tools fashioned by Justice McLachlin
in Tataryn with actual, distinct legal and moral obligations.
Financial need, inter vivos dependency and the TFMA
Nova Scotia jurisprudence is clear on the fact that financial need does not
determine eligibility, entitlement or even quantum with respect to TFMA

74. Ibid at paras 101-102, 109, 116.
75. Ibid at paras 103, 110, 116.
76. Bedford, supra note 57 at paras 124-129; Reference re s 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (British
Columbia), [1985] 2 SCR 486, 1985 CarswellBC 398 at para 129.
77. Lawen, supra note 1 at paras 17, 23.
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orders.78 Spouses can and have made successful claims in Nova Scotia
and other jurisdictions with similar statutes without having established
financial need.79 This fact can also be discerned from section 5 of the
TFMA, which directs a court, when deciding such awards, to consider
factors totally unrelated to financial need such as the character and conduct
of the claimant, the nature of the relations between the dependant and the
testator at time of death, and any services rendered to the testator by the
claimant.80
Additionally, the ability to bring a claim of support against the testator
while living cannot be an eligibility factor of the TFMA due to the express
exclusion of common law spouses who have not registered as domesticpartners of the deceased,81 and stepchildren from the Act. These claimants
are eligible for claims of support against a living testator in Nova Scotia
upon family breakdown.82 For those common law spouses in Nova Scotia
whose partner dies intestate or fails to provide for them through a will,
their only recourse is to establish a claim in unjust enrichment against the
intestate’s estate. Such a claim cannot be grounded in financial dependency
but instead must prove an uncompensated contribution to the estate itself.83
Notably, in the 2020 decision of LeBlanc v Cushing Estate, the TFMA
was found to contravene the section 15 Charter rights of a testator’s

78. Justice Saunders (as he then was), writing for the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, held that a
“claimant need not show actual or urgent need or true dependency in order to succeed” in a TFMA
application. Sandhu v Sandhu Estate, [1999] NSJ No 157, 1999 CarswellNS 134 at para 107 [Sandhu].
See also Welsh v McKee-Daly, 2014 NSSC 356 at para 55.
79. Sandhu, supra note 78 at paras 106–107; Paxman v Saskatchewan (Public Trustee) (1996),
14 ETR (2d) 22, 1996 CarswellSask 422 at para 11. See also Dorota Miler, “Does a Will Stand a
Chance under the Current Interpretation and Application of Dependants’ Relief Legislation in British
Columbia?” (2018) 51 UBC L Rev 385 at 395.
80. TFMA, supra note 2, s 5(1)(a), (c), (g).
81. Vital Statistics Act, supra note 24, s 53.
82. Parenting and Support Act, RSNS 1989, c 160, ss 2(i)(ii), 2(m)(v)–(vi). As noted at the beginning
of this article, common law spouses who are not officially registered as domestic-partners and minor
step-children are excluded not only from the TFMA but also from Nova Scotia’s laws of intestacy.
The exclusion of common law spouses from Nova Scotia’s Intestate Succession Act, RSNS 1989,
c 236 was recently found to constitute a violation of section 15 rights of common law spouses but
nevertheless was saved under section 1 of the Charter. See Jackson Estate v Young, 2020 NSSC 5 at
para 187. In other jurisdictions where such claimants are similarly excluded from intestacy schemes,
they are nevertheless able to make dependants’ relief claims if a testator dies without a will. See e.g.
Prelorentzos v Havaris, 2016 ONCA 727; Deleon v Estate of Raymon DeRanney, 2020 ONSC 19;
Naiker v Naiker Estate (1997), 1997 CarswellBC 2522, 19 ETR (2d) 167 (CA); Renko v Stevens
Estate (1998), 47 BCLR (3d) 7, 1998 CarswellBC 397 (CA). Indeed, it is quite odd to contemplate
that although the Supreme Court of Canada has held that one cannot unilaterally terminate one’s
loco parentis status (with respect to child support and step-children), in Nova Scotia, a testator
may effectively do so upon his or her death. See e.g. Chartier v Chartier, [1999] 1 SCR 242, 1999
CarswellMan 25.
83. Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 at paras 31-45.
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common law spouse by recognizing only widows or registered domesticpartners as spouses of a testator.84 Ironically, the ratio of Lawen factored
into the reasons why the exclusion of common law spouses from the TFMA
was justified under section 1 of the Charter.85
Legal versus moral obligations in dependants’ relief decisions
The second problem with Justice Bodurtha’s purpose-based distinction in
Lawen is a conflation of interpretive tools with actual terms of art. While
dependants’ relief decisions often refer to a testator’s “legal obligations”
and “moral obligations,” these terms are simply idiomatic expressions
created by Justice McLachlin to describe two major social norms used to
interpret and apply dependants’ relief legislation.
One of the most significant findings in Tataryn was that financial
need was not the objective of what was then British Columbia’s Wills
Variation Act.86 Justice McLachlin instead determined that its purpose was
to ensure that the spouses and children of testators were provided for in
an “adequate, just and equitable” manner,87 and that awards made under
the statute should be interpreted in accordance with contemporary values
and societal expectations.88 Since financial need was not the determining
factor for entitlement or quantum, Justice McLachlin sought to identify “a
yardstick” by which to measure and evaluate such claims.89 After briefly
canvassing previous methods used by BC courts90 she suggested instead
that two social norms guide the process, what she called the “legal” and
“moral obligations” of testators.91 In her words, the legal obligations of a
testator refer to “the obligations which the law would impose on a person
during his or her life were the question of provision for the claimant to
arise.”92 The moral obligations, she explained, “are found in society’s

84. Leblanc v Cushing Estate, 2020 NSSC 162 [Leblanc]. Only those common law spouses who
both agree to make a domestic-partner declaration are recognized as Registered Domestic Partnership.
Vital Statistics Act, supra note 24, s 53.
85. For example, the court in Leblanc held that the conclusion in Lawen justified narrowing the
group of eligible dependants in the TFMA rather than expanding it. This was especially so given
that the right of testamentary autonomy was already abrogated by the TFMA with respect to married
spouses, registered domestic partners and the children of the testator. In the court’s opinion, the
exclusion of common law spouses from the Act served to prevent further harm to the constitutional
right of testamentary autonomy (Leblanc, supra note 84 at para 203).
86. RSBC 1979, c 435.
87. Tataryn, supra note 10 at para 17.
88. Ibid at para 15.
89. Ibid at para 27.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid at para 28.
92. Ibid.
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reasonable expectations of what a judicious person would do in the
circumstances, by reference to contemporary community standards.”93
Neither of these “obligations” are legal in nature except to the extent
that they flow from a dependants’ relief act. They are simply concepts
fashioned by the former Chief Justice to assist a court in determining
entitlement and quantum of a dependants’ relief claim in conjunction with
the specific terms of a particular statute.
Additionally, and contrary to Justice Bodurtha’s reasoning, both kinds
of obligations are fundamentally moral in nature. Indeed, when explaining
a testator’s “moral obligations,” Justice McLachlin included examples of
applicants who could ground their claims firmly on the “legal obligations”
pillar of the statute as well as those who could not:
[M]ost people would agree that although the law may not require a
supporting spouse to make provision for a dependent spouse after his
death, a strong moral obligation to do so exists if the size of the estate
permits. Similarly, most people would agree that an adult dependent
child is entitled to such consideration as the size of the estate and the
testator’s other obligations may allow.94

A similar rationale is echoed in the decisions of other jurisdictions before
and after the Tataryn decision. In Cummings v Cummings,95 Justice Blair
adopted and applied Tataryn even though adult independent children
are not eligible for dependants’ relief in Ontario.96 He noted that the
enumerated factors in Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act97 were moral
in nature. Specifically, Justice Blair described factors used to assess an
order of support against a living person under Ontario’s family law system,
such as “the length of time the spouses cohabited” as informing the “moral
obligations” of a testator,98 even though presumably such factors would
assist in discerning the “legal obligations” of a testator.99
The recognition that all dependants’ relief claims are undergirded with
moral norms is certainly evident in Nova Scotia’s case law. For example,
in Zwicker the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal classified the duty to support

93. Ibid.
94. Ibid at para 31.
95. (2004), 235 DLR (4th) 474, [2004] OJ No 90 (Ont CA) [Cummings].
96. Verch v Weckworth, 2014 ONCA 338; Spence v BMO Trust Co, 2016 ONCA 196 [Spence CA].
97. Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S 26.
98. Specifically s 62(1)(g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (o), r(ii) Cummings, supra note 95 at para 45.
99. Rodney Hull, “A Turn in The Road of Dependants’ Relief Claims in Ontario” (2005) 13 ETR
(3d) 24.
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dependants as moral, whether the dependant in question is a former spouse
or an adult independent child.100
When Tataryn was first released, the reasoning of Justice McLachlin
was subject to criticism by leading scholars on the subject of dependants’
relief, in part for the confusion it appeared to cause on this very issue.101
However, since Tataryn, the notion of moral versus legal obligations of
testators has become common currency among legal writers, blurring
lines between normative tools of interpretation and actual terms of art.102
Indeed, the terms are often used loosely and confusingly by the judiciary
as well, including by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Cummings and the
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Zwicker.103
While this error is usually immaterial with respect to the application
and outcome of most dependants’ relief claims, it is problematic in Lawen
because it is used to justify an untenable section 1 decision. Perhaps a
clearer way of viewing Justice McLachlin’s reasoning in Tataryn is to view
the claims of different dependants as simply varying in moral worth. This
is likely what Justice McLachlin meant when she noted that the claims of
adult independent children “may be more tenuous” than those of former
spouses.104 Regardless, the nature of all claims made under the TFMA is
legal while the objective of the Act in fulfilling those claims is inherently
moral.
c. A pressing and substantial purpose
Finally, based on the ubiquitous nature of legislation with an identical
objective to that of the TFMA and the failed Charter challenges to

100. Zwicker, supra note 22 at paras 42-47.
101. Leopold Amighetti, “Tataryn v Tataryn Estate” (1994–95) 14 E & TJ 277; Carolyn L Berardino
& Robert C Freedman, “Tataryn v. Tataryn Estate” (1994) 52:6 Advocate 897.
102. See e.g. Trevor Todd & Judith Milliken, “Disinheriting Adult Independent Children under the
B.C. Wills Variation Act” LawNow March/April 2011 at 16; Kathleen Cunningham, “Succession law
reform proposals in B.C.: A comparative review” (2007) 27:1 ETPJ at 41. Note: Cunningham’s study
also wrongly concludes that no dependants’ relief statute in Canada other than BC’s allows adult
children to make claims against the estate (at 42).
103. Justice Blair’s reasons waiver between contrasting the needs of the claimants and a testator’s
moral responsibility to them (with no mention of the word “legal”) and listing a variety of factors
considered in dependants’ relief claims including “not only… needs and means but also…legal and
moral or ethical claims.” Cummings, supra note 95 at para 34. In Zwicker, supra note 23, the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal remarked, “The legal and moral duty to support a wife, infant children or
disabled adult children is obviously much stronger than the moral duty to give marginal support to a
normal adult child, male or female” at para 43.
104. Tataryn, supra note 10 at para 31. As noted above, unlike most jurisdictions in Canada, a
surviving spouse cannot make a division of property claim against an estate and, if left less than he or
she would have received in the event of a separation, must file an application for the variation of the
will. Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 81.
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such legislation, it is more than likely that the TFMA’s “purely moral
objective”105 passes the first step of the Oakes test.
In his discussion on this point, Justice Bodurtha reviewed Supreme
Court of Canada precedent on obscenity laws, Sunday closing regulations,
and the voting rights of incarcerated Canadians,106 and concluded that
courts should not defer to legislatures on issues of social policy, particularly
when fundamental rights are limited by such policies.107 Starkly absent
from this inquiry, however, is any mention or discussion of the law that
pervades Canadian society with an objective directly analogous to that of
the TFMA: family law legislation.
The objective of family law is inherently moral in nature. None of the
major legal obligations imposed by family law statutes following family
breakdown are based solely on dependency or financial need. Instead they
are largely based on what we as a society think members of a family owe
one another.108 This includes the division of property between separated
spouses,109 spousal support110 and child support.111 For example, while no
legal obligation exists for living parents to provide for children over the
age of majority, even if they are disabled adult children,112 this changes
when parents separate. Not only do disabled adult children have a right
to receive child support from their separated parents,113 a legal obligation
also exists to support all adult children during their first post-secondary
degree.114 The overarching purpose of all family law legislation, including

105. Lawen, supra note 1 para 86
106. Ibid at paras 87-96.
107. Ibid at para 96.
108. It is particularly ironic, then, that Justice Bodurtha’s reasons rely on a resemblance to inter vivos
obligations imposed by family law to distinguish the claims of widows and minor children under
the TFMA as something other than moral in nature. To identify certain norms as legal and not moral
simply because they resemble other laws is circular reasoning, particularly when the inter vivos laws
in question are themselves based on what many would view as inherently moral considerations.
109. Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5.
110. Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813, 1992 CarswellMan 143.
111. Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, s 3, 4, 7.
112. Krangle (Guardian ad litem of) v Brisco, 2002 SCC 9. An exception to this is a 2018 amendment
of Alberta’s family law legislation. See s 46(b)(ii) of the Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5.
113. If a “child of the marriage”is deemed “unable, by reason of illness, disability or other cause,
to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life” Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd
Supp), s 2(1); Senos v Karcz, 2014 ONCA 459. See also Christine Dobby, “Whose Responsibility?
Disabled Adult ‘Children of the Marriage’ under the Divorce Act and the Canadian Social Welfare
State” (2005) 20 Windsor Rev L & Soc Issues 41.
114. Kozak v Moore, 2020 SKQB 22; Makdissi v Masson, 2020 ONSC 343; Mumtaz v Suhail,
2019 ONSC 6234. See also Nicholas Bala & David Faour, “When Does Childhood End? Canada’s
Lengthening Obligation to Support Adult Children” (2014) 33:1 CFLQ 69.
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dependants’ relief, is, as one commentator has observed, that of “social
engineering,”115 and not simply to keep dependants off the state dole.
At the very least, Justice Bodurtha’s review of this issue should have
included the lower court decisions concerning section 7 Charter challenges
to resource-redistributive family law legislation.116 While none of these
short judgements engage in a section 1 analysis, this is only because the
section 7 argument in each case was deemed to be a protection of property
argument and not one of liberty. As one Court held, “[i]n short, there is no
Charter right not to pay something such as spousal support.”117 Indeed,
the fact that the purpose of such statutes has never been impugned in a
reported decision, combined with the low bar in place concerning this step
of the Oakes test,118 suggests that the objective of the TFMA, like other
family law legislation, relates directly to concerns that are considered
pressing and substantial in our democratic society.
III. The case for allowing adult independent children to make claims
against a parent’s estate
This paper has argued that the constitutional findings in Lawen are
incorrect and should be overturned upon appeal. If anything, the decision
makes it clear that the removal of adult independent children as dependants
from the TFMA is not a Charter matter but instead a role for the Nova
Scotia Legislature. The final portion of this paper argues that, following
a successful appeal of Lawen, the Nova Scotia government should not
remove adult independent children as dependants from the TFMA if faced
with the question of legislative reform. First, their removal is unnecessary
given the broad discretion accorded to courts when faced with these kinds
of claims. Second, by keeping them as dependents, Nova Scotia courts
will retain a more robust ability to censure the use of wills for purposes
contrary to public policy, namely the perpetuation of discrimination
through the private law.
1. A matter of discretion
The legal obligation imposed upon a testator towards their dependants by
the TFMA and similar statutes is not absolute in nature and remains subject
to the complete discretion of the courts. Each claim is to be determined
115. Paul L Coxworthy, “Case comment: Lawen Estate v Nova Scotia (Attorney General)” (2019)
39:1 ETPJ 44 at 52.
116. Shaw v Stein, 2004 SKQB 194; Thurlow v Shedden, 2009 SKQB 35; M (CA) v Q (MD), 2014
BCPC 110 [M (CA)]
117. M (CA), supra note 116 at para 39.
118. Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2019 Student Edition (Toronto: Thomson Reuters,
2019) at 38-23.
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on a case-by-case basis with no concrete indicators of entitlement or
quantum. Indeed, this was a large part of the Attorney General’s argument
in Lawen: the provisions in the TFMA are discretionary in nature119 and
this discretion has long been used to award adult independent children
less than other dependants—if they are awarded anything at all—in Nova
Scotia and elsewhere.120
Before penning his constitutional findings, Justice Bodurtha reviewed
the dependants’ relief legislation of other Canadian jurisdictions. His
purpose in doing so was to demonstrate that most jurisdictions exclude
adult independent children from their dependants’ relief acts.121 Aside
from this conclusion being somewhat misleading122 the review itself failed
to discuss how some jurisdictions have dealt with societal unease towards
adult independent children’s dependants’ relief claims without altering
their legislation.
One such jurisdiction is that of neighbouring New Brunswick,
where claims by adult independent children against their parents’ estates
are permitted under the province’s Provision for Dependants Act.123
Since the New Brunswick Court of Appeal’s 1995 decision in Currie v
Currie (Estate),124 no PFDA claim made by an adult independent child
in New Brunswick has been successful.125 In Currie, Justice Bastarache
of the NBCA (as he then was) held that adult children claimants had to
demonstrate “a special need or other special claim” in order to be eligible
for dependants’ relief in New Brunswick.126 Examples cited by Justice
Bastarache included:
a disability on the part of an adult child, an assured expectation on the
part of an adult child, or an implied expectation on the part of an adult
child, arising from the abundance of the estate or from the adult child’s
treatment during the testator’s lifetime.127
119. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 59.
120. Zwicker, supra note 23 at paras 15-17 citing Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd at 20-21; Cross
v Currie Estate (1987), 1987 CarswellNS 91, 28 ETR 113 (SC) at para 27 [Cross] citing Pontifical
Society for the Propagation of the Faith v Scales (1962), 107 CLR 9, [1962] HCA 19 at 19.
121. Lawen, supra note 1 at para 40.
122. Prior to the decision in Lawen, exactly half of Canada’s provinces permitted dependant relief
applications by adult, independent children (see various acts, supra note 24).
123. RSNB 2012, c 111.
124. [1995] NBJ No 305, 166 NBR (2d) 144 (QB) [Currie]. When Currie was decided, the Act was
operating under its former version: RSNB 1973, c P-22.3.
125. See e.g. Robicheau v McGibbon, [1995] NBJ No 356, 165 NBR (2d) 255 (QB); Spinney v
Spinney Estate, 1995 CarswellNB 444, [1995] ANB No 367 (QB); Lawrence v Johnston Estate,
[2000] NBJ No 105, 2000 CarswellNB 92 (QB); Holland v Holland Estate (2000), [2000] NBJ No
426, 231 NBR (2d) 50 (QB); Branch v Branch Estate, 2004 NBQB 258.
126. Currie, supra note 124 at para 25.
127. Ibid at para 21 citing Price v Lypchuk Estate (1987), 11 BCLR (2d) 371, 1987 CarswellBC 43
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In addition, Justice Bastarache held that whether a testator had neglected
his or her adult children when they were minors was not a relevant factor in
considering the testator’s moral obligations towards them at the time of his
or her death.128 The effect of the Currie decision was the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal’s adoption of the “moral obligation” norm from Tataryn
and the determination of what it meant in New Brunswick. In the New
Brunswick Court of Appeal’s opinion, the standard for ordering relief for
adult independent children is very high, requiring a set of circumstances
that could very well attract a separate legal claim against an estate
altogether, such as unjust enrichment or promissory estoppel.
Saskatchewan is another province which takes a similarly restrictive
approach to such claims: adult children who are deemed physically and
mentally able and fiscally independent must demonstrate that they have
“sacrificed [themselves] for the parent in question” in order to be granted
relief under Saskatchewan’s Dependants’ Relief Act.129
Unlike New Brunswick or Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia is inconsistent
in its handling of TFMA orders that concern adult independent children.
Older cases tend to follow the more generous approach adopted in Tataryn,
although many of them pre-date that decision. In these cases, adult
independent children were awarded relief under the version of the TFMA
in force at the time where testators were found to have been neglectful or
abusive towards them and/or failed to have financially provided for them
while they were minors. Additionally, and perhaps equally important, the
estates in these cases were deemed large enough that a TFMA award would
not prejudice the financial circumstances of other beneficiaries.130
However, more recent Nova Scotia Supreme Court decisions have
denied the claims of adult independent children. Judges have held these
individuals have no automatic entitlement to a testator’s estate, particularly
when reliable evidence before the Court explained why they were left
little or nothing by the testator.131 Some decisions, in dismissing such
applications, have alluded to similar criteria to those listed in Currie.132
(CA).
128. Ibid at para 24.
129. Dependants’ Relief Act, 1996, SS 1996, c D-25.01; Ross v Redl Estate, 2010 SKCA 59 at para 10.
130. See e.g. Corkum v Corkum (1976), 1976 CarswellNS 184, 74 DLR (3d) 700 (SC(AD)); Zwicker,
supra note 23; Hart (Guardian ad litem of) v Hart Estate (1993), 1993 CarswellNS 86, 1 ETR (2d) 92
(SC); Walker v Walker Estate, 1998 NSSC 55; Schofield Estate v Schofield (1988), 1988 CarswellNS
297, 84 NSR (2d) 404 (CA); Harvey v Powell Estate (1988), 1988 CarswellNS 81, 30 ETR 143
(SC(TD)), affd (1989), 1989 CarswellNS 77, 36 ETR 100 (CA); Re Joudrey Estate (1989), 1989
CarswellNS 73, 32 ETR 227 (SC(TD)); Kuhn v Kuhn Estate (1992), 1992 CarswellNS 104, 46 ETR
150 (SC(TD)); Baird v Baird Estate, [2001] NSJ No 209, 2001 CanLII 5604 (SC).
131. See e.g. Irving v Irving Estate, 2016 NSSC 188; White v White Estate, 2007 NSSC 254.
132. Welsh v McKee-Daly, 2014 NSSC 356 at para 63.
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Still other decisions in Nova Scotia contain elements of both Currie and
Tataryn, as they consider facts that would give rise to special claims on
the part of the adult child as well as poorly perceived behavior on the part
of a testator.133
This variety of reasoning highlights a point made in the most oft cited
case concerning adult children and the TFMA. In Currie, Bastarach J.A.
referenced the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decision in Zwicker, noting
that the NSCA recognized “the necessity of reviewing old cases with a
critical eye because of the need to adapt the exercise of judicial discretion
to present social norms.” 134 It may be that the present social norms of Nova
Scotia have shifted away from awarding TFMA claims to adult children.
It was certainly open to whichever court heard the TFMA application of
Jack Lawen’s daughters to exercise its discretion in accordance with those
norms.
In addition to being relatively benign in nature, it is further argued that
the inclusion of adult independent children in dependants’ relief legislation
is important as it may assist in preventing the use of wills to perpetuate
discrimination through the private law.
2. Discrimination and dependants’ relief claims
The use of one’s will to punish, coerce and otherwise keep family
members in conformity to one’s own worldview is an unfortunate but time
honoured tradition in the realm of estate law.135 Challenges to testamentary
conditions restricting a beneficiary’s decision to marry, choice of religion,
or the religion or ethnicity of a beneficiary’s spouse have been the subject
of court challenges for at least three hundred years.136 These challenges
have been largely unsuccessful, with the notable exception of modern
day Canada. Canadian jurists have pioneered the application of the
common law public policy doctrine to void conditions and gifts in wills

133. See e.g. McIntyre v McNeil Estate, 2010 NSSC 135 where the testator was found to have been
abusive towards his children but also benefited from services rendered by them that went above and
beyond those expected from a child (at paras 30, 49). See also Redmond v Redmond Estate (1996),
1996 CarswellNS 441, 14 ETR (2d) 262 (SC); Cox v Nova Scotia (Public Trustee) (1983), 1983
CarswellNS 307, 56 NSR (2d) 657 (SC(TD)); Miller v Rankin Estate (1986), 1986 CarswellNS 194,
72 NSR (2d) 441 (SC (TD)); Brown v Brown Estate, 2005 NSSC 271.
134. Currie, supra note 125 at para 17.
135. Indeed, Justice Bodurtha’s characterization of testamentary autonomy may simply be a softer
way of stating this fact (Lawen, supra note 1 at para 46).
136. Thomson, supra note 55 at 142. See also S Grattan & H Conway, “Testamentary Conditions in
Restraint of Religion in the Twenty-First Century: An Anglo-Canadian Perspective” (2005) 50 McGill
LJ 511.
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that perpetuate forms of discrimination such as racism, sexism, religious
intolerance or homophobia.137
However, one facet of estate law recently held to be immune to
public policy scrutiny is the practice of “disinheriting” an adult child
for discriminatory reasons,138 such as the child’s sexual orientation, their
gender, or some other immutable, personal quality that offends the testator.
The reason why traditional applications of public policy may be
inapplicable to these particular scenarios stems from the 2016 Ontario
Court of Appeal decision of Spence v BMO Trust Co.139 In that case, a
judge of Ontario’s Superior Court voided an entire will after finding the
motivations of the testator in making it, contravened public policy.140 The
uncontested evidence suggested the testator had left nothing to his adult
daughter because she had conceived a child with a man of a different
race.141 The decision was overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal. In her
reasons, Justice of Appeal Cronk noted that in Ontario, adult independent
children were not eligible for dependants’ relief and therefore held no
entitlement to their parents’ estates.142 This lack of entitlement factored
into the Ontario Court of Appeal’s finding that an unconditional clause in
a will that simply stated a child was “disinherited”—even for expressly
discriminatory reasons—could never be subject to a public policy review.
As Justice Cronk explained:
Absent valid legislative provision to the contrary, the common law
principle of testamentary freedom thus protects a testator’s right to
unconditionally dispose of her property and to choose her beneficiaries
as she wishes, even on discriminatory grounds.143

137. Thomson, supra note 55. Notably, public policy has been used by the courts to censure
discrimination in wills because the Charter and provincial and federal human rights legislation have
both been found to be inapplicable to that area of the law. University of Victoria Foundation v British
Columbia (Attorney General), 2000 BCSC 445 at para 14; Spence CA, supra note 96 at paras 125-126.
If the decision in Lawen is upheld, we will have the ironic finding that testamentary autonomy itself
attracts Charter protection but the use of it to discriminate against others remains immune to Charter
scrutiny.
138. The use of scare quotes indicates that technically there is no such thing as disinheriting a child in
Canada. Apart from discretionary dependants’ relief schemes in each province, testators have no legal
testamentary obligations to any family member. However, the term is used here to describe the act of
leaving an adult child nothing by way of one’s will due to some perceived transgression on the part of
the child.
139. Spence CA, supra note 96.
140. Spence v BMO Trust Co, 2015 ONSC 615 [Spence SC].
141. This reason was not expressly stated in the will, but it was accepted by the trial judge with the
assistance of affidavit evidence (ibid at paras 44-45).
142. Spence CA, supra note 96 at para 37.
143. Ibid at para 75.
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Justice Cronk reasoned that because Ontario courts possessed no mechanism
to vary the distribution of gifts in a will under such circumstances, an
interference with the wording of the will that generated no relief for the
complainant constituted an unwarranted intrusion upon the principle of
testamentary freedom.144
I have argued elsewhere that the decision in Spence effectively
provides permission for testators in Ontario to actively use their wills to
perpetuate discrimination. While discrimination between members of a
family is not normally subject to judicial review, instructions in a will
are. A will is a legal document that often requires review and approval by
courts for matters of probate or construction. The use of the private law to
perpetuate discrimination and promote cruelty and degradation should, at
the very least, be open to judicial examination and review. 145
But what if Veroline Spence had qualified as a dependant under
Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act?146 Would the Ontario Court of
Appeal’s decision have been different? An examination of the law on
discretionary orders and Charter values, and a review of what has actually
occurred when this issue has arisen in other jurisdictions, reveals that it
may well have been. Given this fact, the case for the inclusion of adult
independent children in dependants’ relief schemes becomes clear.
a.

Charter values, discretionary authority and dependants’ relief
legislation
Charter values are a somewhat nebulous concept, but they have been
described by the Supreme Court as “those values that underpin each
[Charter] right and give it meaning.”147 Examples range from values that
mimic the rights they underpin such as equality, privacy and liberty to
more abstract but fundamental ideas such as human dignity.148 Since the
case of Dolphin Delivery Ltd v RWDSU, Local 580,149 the Supreme Court
of Canada has maintained the need for judges to interpret and apply the
common law in accordance with Charter values. As explained by Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé in her dissent (but not on this point) in M(A) v Ryan,150
144. Ibid at para 85.
145. Thomson, supra note 55.
146. At trial, she applied for an extension of the time period for applying for a dependants’ relief claim
under Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S-26 on behalf of her son but was denied
this request by the superior court (Spence SC, supra note 140 at paras 3-5). She did not appeal this
finding (Spence CA, supra note 96 at para 22).
147. Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 at para 36 [Loyola High School].
148. Mark S Harding & Rainer Knopff, “‘Charter Values’ vs. Charter Dialogue” (2013) 31:2 Nat’l J
Const L 161 at 162.
149. [1986] 2 SCR 573, 1986 CarswellBC 411.
150. M (A) v Ryan, [1997] 1 SCR 157, 1997 CarswellBC 99 at paras 63-64 [Ryan].
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this obligation is also entailed in the judicial exercise of discretionary
authority by way of statute:
In many cases, the exercise of discretion, through the making of an order,
for example, will not constitute direct state action and therefore cannot
be subject to the same constitutional scrutiny as legislation or the acts of
state officials. Where this occurs, this Court has nonetheless found that
the exercise of discretion must adequately reflect the values underlying
the Charter…
The fact that the discretion exercised here involves procedural entitlements
in a civil dispute between private parties rather than a criminal trial does
not fundamentally alter the analysis. There are a number of civil cases
involving private parties which found that the discretionary powers
granted by statute or a common law rule must be exercised in a manner
which comports with the values underlying the Charter: …In such cases,
however, the balancing of values may be somewhat more flexible than in
those involving the state as a party[.]

While the Supreme Court has held in Bell ExpressVu Ltd Partnership
v Rex151 that Charter values may only be used to interpret and apply
statutes in the event of an ambiguity,152 discretionary orders made under
statutes like the TFMA represent a completely different scenario. Ordering
dependants’ relief is not a matter of interpreting a statute, but of applying
the broad discretion accorded by that statute.153
Given the precedent set out by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Ryan,
Charter values must inform any decision related to a dependants’
relief claim. Specifically, Charter values such as equality and human
dignity should be considered in those cases that involve allegations of
discrimination. Of course, when faced with such a claim, a court must
also consider competing Charter values such as privacy or common law
principles like testamentary freedom. The point is not that equality and
dignity should always trump testamentary autonomy or privacy, but that
the former values must not be automatically trumped simply because
this is an area of private rather than public law. The key, as referenced
by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Ryan, is that all these values be balanced
accordingly in the context of the matter at issue.154
151. 2002 SCC 42.
152. Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th edition supplemented (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2007) Vol II s 37.2(b) at 37-29 [Hogg, “2007”]
153. Notably, there is no need to resort to the findings of the Supreme Court in Loyola High School,
supra note 147 or Doré v Québec (Tribunal des professions), 2012 SCC 12, as those decisions refer
to the use of Charter values with respect to discretionary decisions taken by administrative decisionmakers rather than judges.
154. Ryan, supra note 150 at para 64.
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This notion appears to be borne out by the case law on the subject.
In a handful of reported dependants’ relief decisions, discrimination
based on sex or sexual orientation has factored into a will variation. All
of these cases were heard in British Columbia where the vast majority of
will variation claims by independent adult children in Canada are made.
They demonstrate that courts, when exercising their discretion under
section 60 of British Columbia’s Wills, Estates and Succession Act155 or
the Province’s former Wills Variation Act,156 consider discrimination a
relevant and determinative factor in the decision to vary a will.
b. The BC cases
The most recent case involving discrimination and dependants’ relief is
Grewal v Litt, wherein British Columbia’s Supreme Court significantly
altered a set of mirror wills that left ninety-four per cent of a multi-million
dollar estate to the testators’ two adult sons and the remaining six per cent
to their four adult daughters.157 In that case, Justice Adair found the parents
had failed in their moral obligation to their adult independent daughters.158
Notably, discrimination based on sex was not the sole reason behind the
ruling. The judgement also found that the daughters had contributed to
their parents’ business while growing up and had cared for them in their old
age despite the cruel and unfair treatment the daughters had received from
their parents in return.159 However, discrimination played a significant role
in affirming the Court’s decision to vary the wills.160
A similar ruling occurred in Prakash v Singh,161 where the daughters
of a testatrix were left token gifts while her sons were left the majority of
her estate. In that case, the Court held that the testatrix “viewed the [IndoFijian] tradition as binding upon her testamentary choices, or at least
highly influential.”162 In varying the will, the judgement stated: “In modern
Canada, where the rights of the individual and equality are protected by
law, the norm is for daughters to have the same expectations as sons when
it comes to sharing in their parents’ estates.”163
In Peden v Peden Estate,164 the BC Supreme Court varied a will after
finding that one of the testator’s three sons, who had cared for both of his
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

SBC 2009, c 13.
Wills Variation Act, supra note 86.
2019 BCSC 1154 at paras 5-7 [Grewal].
Ibid at para 210.
Ibid at paras 173-190
Ibid at para 155.
Prakash v Singh, 2006 BCSC 1545 [Prakash].
Ibid at para 41.
Ibid at para 58.
Peden v Peden Estate, 2006 BCSC 1713 [Peden].
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parents and his maternal grandmother in their ill health, had received a
much smaller gift than his brothers because of his sexual orientation.165
In reaching its decision in Peden, the Court cited the 1984 case of
Patterson v Lauritsen,166 wherein the Court accepted evidence by way of
solicitor’s notes that proved the testatrix had chosen to exclude her son
from her will because he was gay and addicted to drugs. In varying the
will, the Court concluded that the testator’s suspicion that her son was
addicted to drugs was “unfounded” and held that “homosexuality is not
a factor in today’s society justifying a judicious parent disinheriting or
limiting benefits to his child”.167
c. What the BC cases tell us
While the BC cases provide some insight into the issue of discrimination
and dependants’ relief claims by an adult independent child, they must be
assessed in the context of that province’s dependants’ relief jurisprudence.
Unlike New Brunswick or Saskatchewan, British Columbia courts lean
towards adult children’s default entitlement to inheritance rather than
requiring that a child prove extraordinary circumstances in order to
succeed in his or her application.168
Additionally, in all the BC cases, the discrimination identified by the
courts was not expressly stated on the face of the will. In other words,
these were not cases of a will explicitly perpetuating discrimination like
Justice Cronk’s hypothetical example in Spence.169 Instead, in these cases,
the motivations of the testator were held to be discriminatory in nature
and proven so by evidence outside of the testator’s will. Such a finding,
however, is not permissible in most Canadian jurisdictions. Absent
legislative amendment, extrinsic evidence of a testator’s motivations or
“true intention” is inadmissible.170 Therefore, outside jurisdictions like BC,
the use of dependants’ relief legislation to curb discrimination in estate law
will likely only occur in cases of express, explicit discrimination on the
face of the will. It seems clear, however, that if implicit discrimination can
165. Ibid at para 55.
166. Patterson v Lauritsen (1984), 58 BCLR 182, 1984 CarswellBC 381 (BCSC) [Patterson].
167. Ibid at paras 3, 5.
168. Miler, supra note 79 at 396-397.
169. Justice Cronk described a clause that “facially offend[ed] public policy” (Spence CA, supra note
96 at para 72).
170. These include matters of probate, if the will contains a latent ambiguity or if the testator made a
gift to someone she knew was deceased at the time the gift was made. Oosterhoff et al, supra note 7
at 490. This is why in Spence CA, supra note 96, the evidence of the testator’s racist motivations was
inadmissible under Ontario’s estate law regime (at para 110). British Columbia has amended its estate
legislation to expand the admissibility of extrinsic evidence for the purpose of proving a testator’s
intention. Wills, Estates and Succession Act, SBC 2009, c 13, s 62.
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factor into an adult child’s dependants’ relief claim, explicit discrimination
by way of a disinheritance clause should do so as well.
With these differences accounted for, a few observations about the
role that discrimination has played in this kind of dependants’ relief claim
can be made.
First, when engaging with the discrimination issue, none of the BC
decisions expressly reference a legal authority or influence outside of
the provincial dependants’ relief scheme. 171 However, it can be inferred
that the Court in each of these cases—even the 1984 case of Patterson—
applied its discretion under the legislative scheme in accordance with
Charter values such as equality and human dignity. In Grewal, the Court
labeled discrimination based on sex as “unacceptable,” to the extent that it
was at issue, and found that the testators had failed their moral duty to their
daughters.172 In Prakash, discrimination based on sex was found to be out
of step with “the moral norms of our Canadian society,”173 where “the
rights of the individual and equality are protected by law.”174 In Peden,
the Court simply cited Justice Spencer’s pronouncement in Patterson that
homophobic-motivated discrimination is out of step with current societal
norms.175
Second, and relatedly, it is very clear that prior to ordering a will
variation, the Courts engaged in a balancing of competing Charter values
as well as other policy concerns including testamentary autonomy.176 Even
where discrimination was found, the variance order did not categorically
override the testator’s wishes. In both Grewal and Prakash, the Court
sought to honour the testators’ wishes so far as possible. The orders in
these decisions still resulted in unequal divisions between female and male
171. In Grewal, supra note 157, the applicant daughters alleged that they were discriminated against
on the basis of sex which they said was “contrary to public policy” but the court did not engage with
this express argument (para 137).
172. Ibid at para 207.
173. Prakash, supra note 161 at para 57.
174. Ibid at para 58.
175. Peden, supra note 164 at para 55 citing Patterson, supra note 166 at para 5.
176. Notably, in none of the reported BC decisions were the reasons for a testator’s discrimination
attributed to religion. Instead, “traditional values,” in some cases attributed to a specific culture, were
referenced: Grewal, supra note 157 at para 155; Prakash, supra note 161 at paras 14, 41. Given that
that the jurisdiction of the court to vary a will derives from a statute, a sufficient nexus to attract the
protection of the Charter may be engaged: Hogg, “2007,” supra note 152, Vol II sections 37.2(b)(g)
ps. 37–2, 37–24. If an application is made to vary a will because it expressly discriminates against an
adult child on the basis of religious belief, a court may have to consider not only the discrimination
perpetuated by the will, but also whether an order to vary it would violate the section 2(a) Charter
right of the testator. Indeed, the use of religious wills might attract this issue in those jurisdictions
that permit adult independent children to challenge their parents’ wills. See Jeffrey Talpis, “Religious
Inheritance Laws by the Front and Back Doors in Quebec” (2015) 35:1 ETP J 64 at 78-80.
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children, but less so than originally dictated by the terms of the wills.177
In Peden, a life estate was made an outright gift but was otherwise not
adjusted.178 In Patterson, the excluded child was given a share equal to
those of his siblings even though his financial need was much greater than
theirs.179
Finally, in all the BC cases reviewed, the decision to vary a will
was based on additional factors beyond the testator’s discriminatory
motivations. In every case, the claimant personally cared for their parents
or enriched them financially without compensation and were found to have
had legitimate expectations of inheriting from their parents’ estates.180
The BC cases reveal that while disinheritance based on discrimination
can and does play a role in the decision to vary a will in favour of an adult
child, such decisions have always been supported by additional factors
and have never resulted in a complete override of a testator’s wishes.
In short, these cases demonstrate judicial discretion in accordance with
Charter values, in the balanced manner described by Justice L’HeureuxDubé in Ryan.
d. Holding space for judicial scrutiny
Outside of BC, no dependants’ relief decisions involving discrimination as
the motivation for disinheritance have been reported. The closest was the
Saskatchewan case of Grams v Grams Estate.181 A pleading for a will to be
proven in solemn form included a public policy argument by the testator’s
son, who alleged he was left out of his father’s will because he was gay.
This was not a dependants’ relief application, but a request for the will
to be set aside, similar to what happened at the trial level in Spence. In
ordering the probate trial, the Court in Grams made the following remarks:
[I]t seems appropriate to also observe that the Supreme Court of Canada
has directed that the values found in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms…must be considered when analyzing and considering
common law principles. …
Dependency is currently the only reason set by the Legislature for setting
aside a will on the application of a child: The Dependants’ Relief Act,
1996, SS 1996, c D-25.01.

177. Grewal, supra note 157 at paras 205-208; Prakash, supra note 161 at paras 62-65.
178. Peden, supra note 164 at para 63.
179. Patterson, supra note 166 at para 7.
180. Peden, supra note 164 at paras 10-24; Patterson, supra note 166 at paras 1-2; Prakash, supra
note 161 at paras 34-38; Grewal, supra note 157 at paras 173-190.
181. Grams v Grams Estate, 2015 SKQB 374, leave to appeal to SKCA refused, 2016 SKCA 12
[Grams].
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My function in Stage 1 is to determine if there is a genuine issue to
be tried. In my view, there is a foundation for the argument that a will
which ignores a child because of the child’s sexual orientation will be
set aside.”182

Recall that in Saskatchewan, adult independent children technically qualify
as dependants under the Dependants’ Relief Act. The application judge’s
reasons, though almost certainly unintentionally, highlight again the sole
route available to claimants like Bruce Grams to have the discrimination
leveled against them through the use of estate law, in the wake of the
Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Spence.183
In her reasons in Spence, Justice Cronk alluded to the fact that if the
legislature wanted to prevent disinheritance for discriminatory reasons
in private wills, it could reform its legislation accordingly.184 This is not
necessary in regions where adult children can bring dependants’ relief claims
because those jurisdictions, by including adult children as dependants, have
effectively done just that. Claims brought pursuant to a statute with such
vast discretionary authority must be considered and applied in accordance
with Charter values. This means courts must consider the equality and
dignity of an adult child along with the testamentary autonomy of the
deceased parent. In this way, the inclusion of adult independent children in
dependants’ relief schemes provides a forum for the scrutiny of a specific
type of discrimination within the private law.
While this use of dependants’ relief can deliver an actual financial
remedy in response to discrimination, financial compensation is not the
most important relief that such claims can provide to these children.
As the BC cases demonstrate, a finding of discrimination is not solely
determinative of a variation claim, nor is it capable of completely trumping
the testamentary autonomy of a testator. Given the very strict criteria in
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick’s dependants’ relief legislation, even
if discrimination is proven in accordance with the evidence laws in those
jurisdictions, a claimant may ultimately be unsuccessful in having a will
varied.
Instead, the most important relief is a court of law’s public condemnation
of discrimination perpetuated by a purportedly lawful document, regardless
182. Ibid at paras 23-25.
183. The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Spence CA, supra note 96 was released after the
decision in Grams, ibid. Grams ultimately settled and the trial never proceeded. While the Ontario
Court of Appeal’s decision is not binding on other Canadian jurisdictions, it is nonetheless highly
persuasive given that leave to appeal Spence was refused by the Supreme Court of Canada. See Verolin
Spence, et al v BMO Trust Co, 2016 ONCA 196, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36904 (2016-06-09).
184. Spence CA, supra note 96 at para 85.
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of whether financial relief is ultimately obtained by the adult child, This
in and of itself is a crucial aspect of the administration of justice and the
maintenance of its repute. Indeed, the expressive effect of state action can
be just as important as its tangible, material consequences.185
When adult independent children are removed as dependants from
statutes like the TFMA, a court’s ability to scrutinize and pronounce upon
the use of a will to perpetuate discrimination is hampered. Notably, a case
has recently been reported in British Columbia where a party intends to
argue that the ratio of Lawen should be applied to exclude adult independent
children from the variation of wills in BC 186
Conclusion
In most cases, testators give a great deal of anxious consideration to the
final disposal of their worldly goods. They know better than any other
where kindness came from and where insults came from; and above all
else, it is their property to be given as they wish, restricted only to the
extent required by law.The Court must be cautious, indeed, before they
interfere with such an historic and basic right.187

Testamentary autonomy is a “deeply entrenched common law principle”188
and a significant right recognized by Canada’s Supreme Court as worthy
of protection and respect.189 It is not, however, a Charter right. While there
may be legitimate societal unease with the ability of independent adult
children to challenge a parent’s will, no aspect of the Charter can preclude
such applications where permitted by statute. In explaining this point, this
paper has sought to demonstrate why the decision in Lawen Estate v Nova
Scotia was not only wrong, but also unnecessary and even harmful.
In Lawen, Justice Bodurtha of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court held that
the inclusion of adult independent children as dependants in the Testators’
Family Maintenance Act constituted a violation of a testator’s section 7
right to liberty that could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.
This paper has reviewed how the section 7 and section 1 analyses of the

185. Elizabeth S Anderson & Richard H Plides, “Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement”
(2000) 148:5 U Pa L Rev 1503. For an examination of both the necessity and the challenges of
recognizing expressive harm in Canadian law see Ashleigh Keall, “Conceptions of Harm in the
Canadian Constitutional Adjudication of Religious Freedom” (PhD Dissertation, UCL 2020), copy on
file with author.
186. A recent BC case has allowed the amending of pleadings to include a similar Charter challenge
to the inclusion of adult independent children in its wills legislation. See: Jean-Richard-Dit-Bressel v
Carr, 2020 BCSC 946.
187. Cross, supra note 120 at para 22.
188. Spence CA, supra note 96 at para 30.
189. Tataryn, supra note 10 at para 33.
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decision suffer from significant problems, including a failure to provide
any PFJ analysis and a fundamental misunderstanding as to the purpose
and objective of dependants’ relief legislation in Canada.
The removal of adult independent children from the TFMA is not
a Charter issue but a decision only the government of Nova Scotia can
make. However, this paper has argued that removing these children from
the statute is unnecessary to address popular concerns connected to their
TFMA claims, whereas their continued inclusion provides a forum to
scrutinize a particular form of discrimination perpetuated by private wills.
First and foremost, removing adult independent children from
dependants’ relief statutes is unnecessary, as demonstrated by other
jurisdictions with similar laws. Any societal unease with adult independent
children’s dependants’ relief claims can be reflected in a strict, interpretive
approach by courts. This has been the approach in Saskatchewan and
New Brunswick, where adult independent children are almost always
unsuccessful in their applications to vary a deceased parent’s will.
Second and more importantly, disallowing adult independent
children’s dependants’ relief claims may prove harmful. Given the Ontario
Court of Appeal’s decision in Spence, the inclusion of adult children as
dependents is crucial in providing the only means for a court to examine
and denounce the practice of discriminatory disinheritance in Canada.
Courts are obligated to apply the discretionary authority of dependants’
relief in accordance with Charter values. While such an application
requires a careful balance of various competing values, the values of
equality and human dignity require a court to, at the very least, consider
and pronounce upon discrimination perpetuated through a will. The
jurisprudence is multifaceted, and no reported decision in Canada has ever
resulted in a complete overriding of testamentary autonomy in favour of
the applicant child due to discrimination. However, these decisions also
show how the inclusion of adult children in dependants’ relief schemes can
both assist those who are subject to this kind of discrimination and provide
the opportunity for a court to denounce it in a public forum.
In 2011, British Columbia radically overhauled both its family and
estate legislation. During this process, various actors lobbied for the removal
of adult independent children from its wills variation scheme. Wally Opal,
the Attorney General at that time, cited discrimination against female
children as a main incentive for keeping adult independent children as
dependants under its legislative scheme.190 If faced with a similar decision,
190. Bethany Lindsay, “Here’s why B.C. lets judges rewrite unfair wills,” CBC News (24 July 2019),
online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news> [perma.cc/XM37-TSKT].
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I believe the government of Nova Scotia should follow the example of its
BC counterpart. Indeed, given the recent outcome in Leblanc v Cushing
Estate,191 and in the interests of promoting such values as equality and
dignity, the Nova Scotia government should consider not only keeping
adult children as dependants under the TFMA, but also extending such
relief to the common law spouses and step-children of testators as well.
Post Script
The Appeal in Lawen was heard in February of 2021. It was allowed and
the respondents’ Notice of Contention was dismissed, both from the bench.
Written reasons were released three months later.192 The Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal provided only brief reasons for its decision with respect to the
constitutional aspects of the appeal. Justice Farrar, writing on behalf of
the court, rejected Justice Bordutha’s s. 7 findings based on the absence of
an evidentiary record in the case. The judgment also raised the interesting
question as to whether “public interest standing confers any greater right
to assert a claim on behalf of estates generally than an individual estate
would have”193—although the NSCA declined to answer it.194

191. Leblanc, supra note 84.
192. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Lawen Estate, 2021 NSCA 39
193. Ibid at para 80.
194. For a detailed commentary on the appeal decision see Jane Thomson, “Nova Scotia (Attorney
General) v. Lawen Estate: A Case Comment” (2021) 41 ETPJ 21.
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